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Abstract
To examine the impact of globalization on managerial remuneration, we
consider a matching model where firms compete both in the product mar-
ket and in the managerial market. We show that globalization, i.e., the
simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools, leads
to an increase in the heterogeneity of managerial salaries. Typically, while
the most able managers obtain a wage increase, less able managers are faced
with a reduction in wages. Hence our model is consistent with the increas-
ing heterogeneity of CEO remuneration that has been observed in the last
few decades.
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1 Introduction
The salaries of top managers have recently received considerable public attention. Ac-
cording to Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), the average base salaries and bonuses of
Forbes 800 CEOs increased from 700,000 U.S. dollars in 1970 to more than 2.2 million
dollars in 2002.1 This eﬀect is even larger when stock options are taken into account.
The rapid rise in CEO pay over the last few decades has been confirmed with more
recent data by Frydman and Jenter (2010). Such figures cause particular concern when
they are related to ordinary wages. The ratio between CEO cash compensation and
average pay for production workers in the U.S. climbed from 25:1 in 1980 to 90:1 in
2000 (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). It is hardly surprising that this particular aspect
of income redistribution has been highly controversial. Shareholders, labor unions,
politicians, and mass media have criticized both the level of managerial incomes and
the tenuous connection between pay and performance. The discussion is by no means
confined to the United States, as surveys in the Economist (Economist, 2007) and
Llense (2010) testify. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the discussions have led to
the introduction of transparency rules for managerial pay (Severin, 2003).
Given the amount of public attention and the substantial academic research this area
has attracted, it is surprising that the causes of the recent salary increases are still
imperfectly understood. In line with popular opinion, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) at-
tribute increasing managerial wages to managerial power. Shareholders, so their ar-
gument goes, have limited control over the wage-setting process, and the board often
gives in to the interests of CEOs.
Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) take issue with such explanations. Without necessarily
denying the existence of managerial rent-seeking activities, they argue that an ex-
planation for recent salary increases on this basis would also require an increase in
managerial power, which they find unconvincing. Instead, they propose the idea that
the changes reflect an increasing demand for general, rather than firm-specific, man-
agerial skills, “perhaps as a result of the steady progress in economics, management
1The figures are in 2002 dollars. The Forbes 800 list contains all companies ranked in the top 500
by assets, income, market capitalization, or revenues. Typically, there are about 800 companies on
the list.
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science, accounting, finance and other disciplines which, if mastered by a CEO, can
substantially improve his ability to manage a company” (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004,
p.193). This results in an increasing tendency for outside hiring, and the resulting
competition for managers drives up wages. Gabaix and Landier (2006) argue that the
increase in managerial pay can be attributed to an increase in firm size.
In this paper, we provide a possible alternative explanation of recent trends that re-
lates to informal arguments that are often advanced in popular accounts of the subject.
Some observers regard increasing managerial wages as a by-product of globalization (see
the discussion in Llense 2010, Frydman and Jenter 2010). We therefore examine the
relation between globalization and managerial wages. In particular, we investigate how
the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial markets aﬀects wages.
We consider a matching model where firms compete both in the product market and
in the managerial market. In the product market they interact as oligopolists. In the
managerial labor market they compete for the services of managers with heterogeneous
abilities, which result in diﬀerent marginal cost levels of the firms they manage. Glob-
alization refers to the simultaneous replacement of national markets by one integrated
market with (i) higher demand, (ii) a larger number of firms, and (iii) a larger pool of
managers.
Because channels (i)-(iii) can potentially have countervailing eﬀects on wages, the im-
pact of globalization on managerial remuneration is subtle. Nevertheless, we obtain a
robust prediction about the eﬀects of globalization on the distribution of managerial
wages. Globalization leads to an increase in the heterogeneity of managerial salaries.
Whenever there is a wage increase for some manager, then any more able manager
will also face a wage increase.2 More generally, the diﬀerence between post-integration
wages and pre-integration wages is increasing in ability. Hence, our model can explain
the increasing heterogeneity of CEO renumeration that has been observed in the last
few decades.
However, our model does not predict an increase in the average wage levels of managers
without additional parameter restrictions. The reduction in wages for less competent
2It is also possible that no managers or all managers (except for the least eﬃcient one) receive a
wage increase.
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managers may well oﬀset the wage increases of the most competent managers. Nev-
ertheless, our approach is consistent with the idea that globalization lies behind the
increasing wages of top executives. Empirical results on average managerial salaries
typically refer to the average within a fairly small group of top managers.3 As our
model predicts pay rises for the best-paid managers due to globalization, these aver-
ages should also be expected to rise.
It is crucial for our results that the equilibrium wage diﬀerences between more and
less competent managers reflect the diﬀerences in gross profits (that is, profits before
subtracting managerial wages) between more and less eﬃcient firms. Understanding
the eﬀects of globalization on managerial wages therefore boils down to understanding
how eﬃciency diﬀerences translate into profit diﬀerences. Intuitively, the more intense
competition induced by globalization increases the payoﬀ for being more eﬃcient in
the sense that the profit diﬀerence between the most eﬃcient firm and its less eﬃ-
cient competitors necessarily increases. In the concluding section, we comment on the
robustness of our results within a broader set of theories of managerial compensation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the general version of the
model with symmetric firms. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium of this
model. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of globalization in the symmetric model within
the linear Cournot framework. Section 5 shows that the general characterization of the
equilibrium and the wage eﬀects in the Cournot model are robust to the introduction
of asymmetric firms. It also demonstrates that assortative matching arises, so that
managers are matched to those firms that can make the most of their abilities. Section
6 presents some other extensions of the model that demonstrate the robustness of the
argument that globalization tends to lead to higher wages for the more able managers,
but not necessarily for the less able managers. In particular, we show that the argument
works for a standard model of diﬀerentiated price competition, and that it is robust
to the possibility of exit under globalization. In Section 7, we place the paper in the
context of several strands of literature. Section 8 concludes.
3See footnote 1.
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2 The General Symmetric Model
The model consists of a wage-setting stage followed by an application stage and a
product-market stage. The symmetric firms  = 1      compete for managers  =
1     with  ≥ . Each firm first hires a manager. Ability diﬀerences between
managers are reflected in the marginal costs  of a firm that employs manager . We
index the managers by quality, that is,
1 ≤ 2 ≤    ≤  .
Manager 1 has the highest quality and can achieve the lowest marginal cost. Manager
 has the lowest quality. We assume that at least two managers have diﬀerent quality
levels.
At the wage-setting stage, all firms simultaneously make non-negative wage oﬀers to
all managers. We denote the oﬀer of firm  to manager  as .
In the application stage, after having observed the wage bids, managers decide which
oﬀer to accept. Their payoﬀ is the wage received from their employer. Outside options
are normalized to zero. In the first round of the application stage, each manager accepts
the highest oﬀer. If several firms have oﬀered the most attractive wage to a manager
, he will select the firm with the lowest index. We call this the first tie-breaking rule.
If only one manager accepts an oﬀer from firm , he will be employed. If two or more
managers accept the oﬀer, the firm will select one of them. As a second tie-breaking
rule, we assume that a firm chooses the most competent manager if it is indiﬀerent
among several managers.4 In the second round of the application stage, the procedure
is repeated with the rejected managers and the firms who have not yet filled their
vacancies. The application process continues until each manager is either employed by
a firm or rejected by all firms.
In the product-market stage, the  firms engage in oligopolistic competition, with mar-
ginal costs  given by the outcome of the application stage. We first provide an equilib-
rium characterization result which holds for a wide class of static oligopoly models. To
4This second tie-breaking rule can be dispensed with by formulating the matching process as
a dynamic game where firms approach managers in decreasing order of ability. In such a model
Proposition 1 can still be derived, albeit with higher notational complexity.
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obtain comparative statics with respect to globalization, we then specialize to Cournot
competition with homogeneous goods and an inverse demand function  =  − ,
where  is aggregate output,  is the price, and ,  are two positive numbers. In Sec-
tion 6.4, we show that our main comparative statics result also applies to a standard
model of price competition with diﬀerentiatd goods.
We make the following symmetry assumption concerning profits.
Assumption 1: For any given number of firms that are active in the market, the profit
of firm  (gross of managerial wages) is fully determined by the ability of the manager
it employs and by the vector of abilities of the managers employed by the remaining
−1 firms; it remains unchanged if the assignment of these remaining −1 managers
to competitors is changed by a permutation.
Thus, the gross profit of the firm is independent of its own identity and also independent
of how the remaining managers are allocated to firms. It does matter, however, which
managers are active in the market. Assumption 1 is general enough to include homo-
geneous or diﬀerentiated Cournot competition or price competition, but not localized
competition à la Salop or Hotelling.5
According to Proposition 1 below, it will be suﬃcient to consider gross profits in situ-
ations where only the  managers with the highest abilities are employed. Thus, using
Assumption 1, we write Π() for the gross profits of firm  (where managerial wages
are not deducted) if it employs manager  and the best  managers are employed
by some firm in the industry. Finally, net profits (or payoﬀs) of firm i are defined as
Π()− .
3 Equilibria
We now provide a simple characterization of the symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies of the game.
5It is left to future research to find out whether our main results also hold in examples where
Assumption 1 is violated.
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Proposition 1 There always exist symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in which man-
agers 1      are employed and
(i) ∗ = Π()−Π() for    (1)
(ii) ∗ = 0 for  ≥ 
(iii) All firms obtain net profits Π().
All symmetric equilibria must be of this type.
Proof: See Appendix.
We note that the proof does not rely on the specific linear Cournot model we focus
on later. Thus Proposition 1 holds for any type of product market competition that
satisfies Assumption 1.
According to (i), the wage diﬀerentials between managers    reflect the additional
gross profit that a firm achieves by replacing a less competent manager with a more
competent manager at the expense of some competitor. In the proposed equilibrium,
the gross profit increase from hiring better managers is exactly oﬀset by corresponding
wage increases. Conversely, lower wages would be oﬀset by losses in gross profits
resulting from lower eﬃciency. By (ii), the marginal manager receives his outside
option.6 Proposition 1 reflects the two-sided competition in the market for managers.
Firms compete for managers, which induces them to bid wages up to ∗. Managers
compete by accepting the best oﬀer they can obtain from the firms. (iii) follows because
any profit increase from better managers translates completely into higher wages.
For convenience, we have invoked particular tie-breaking rules to resolve indiﬀerences.
There are two alternative approaches that lead to an equilibrium as described in Propo-
sition 1. First, managers apply sequentially to all firms among which they are indiﬀer-
ent. The order in which they choose firms is not crucial. Second, managers coordinate
on how they apply. For instance if they are indiﬀerent among a set of firms, managers
could always select the firm whose index is closest to their own index.7
6In the context of company worker training and technological spillovers, it has been already ob-
served that equilibrium wages of workers or R&D employees are given by their eﬀects on firms profits
(e.g., Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003)).
7The equilibrium does not exist if managers randomize among the set of firms among which they
are indiﬀerent and no revisions of wage oﬀers by firms and applications decisions of accepted managers
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4 The Impact of Globalization
We now consider the eﬀects of globalization, which we think of as the integration of
managerial and/or product markets, resulting in a simultaneous duplication of demand,
the number of firms and the managerial pool. We specify the analysis to the linear
Cournot model to obtain closed-form solutions for wages, using Proposition 1. In
Section 6, we will show that our comparative statics also hold for a standard model of
price competition with diﬀerentiated goods. Thus, the results are not an artefact of
the restriction to strategic substitutes.
4.1 Wages in the Cournot Model
The product market is characterized by a set of  active firms, inverse demand  = −
(  0), and marginal costs (1     ); average costs are  = 1
P
=1
. The output of an
individual firm  is denoted by  and  =
P

 is the aggregate output. The following
assumption ensures that all firms have positive outputs and profits.
Assumption 2: For all  ∈ {1  }
+ 
 + 1 −   0 (2)
An immediate implication of Assumption 2 is that   . Moreover, outputs in a
Cournot oligopoly are
 = 1
µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶

The price is
 = +  + 1 
Gross profits of a firm  that employs a manager  and thus has marginal costs  = 
are
Π() =  ( ) = 1
µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶2
 (3)
are allowed. Then a firm can, for instance, deviate from the candidate equilibrium by setting zero
wages for all managers. Subsequently, with positive probability, the firm under consideration can
employ a manager    at zero wage as the manager  =  may be employed in the first round by
another firm. As a consequence, the expected payoﬀ is larger than Π().
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where ( ) denotes Cournot profits when a firm has marginal costs  and average
industry costs are . According to Proposition 1 and equation (3), the equilibrium
wage of manager  is given by
 =  ( )− (  ) = 1
( − ) ((2+ 2)− (1 + ) ( + ))
 + 1  (4)
Following Proposition 1, we argued that the wage corresponds to the gross profit in-
crease resulting from having a better manager. In (4), this profit increase reflects the
own cost reduction and the simultaneous increase in the costs of one competitor.
4.2 Market duplication
In the remainder of this section we shall consider integration as the simultaneous ad-
dition of symmetric national demands, firms, and manager pools. We shall refer to
this type of integration as market duplication. In Section 5, we will address various
alternatives.
In the benchmark model of market duplication, we assume that two countries of equal
size and with an equal pool of managers integrate. Hence, after integration, instead of
two markets with  =  firms and inverse demand  = − · (  0), we have only
one product market with  = 2 firms, aggregate inverse demand  =  − 
2
· , and
two managers of each quality .8 Equilibrium profits and wages under integration
are denoted by Π and , respectively, where  varies between 1 and  and each
 stands for two firms that have the same marginal cost . Profits and wages before
integration are denoted by Π and , respectively.
Because ++1 − is decreasing in , Assumption 2 is easier to satisfy for  =  than for
 = 2 , that is, survival under autarky is easier than under globalization. Intuitively,
while integration increases competition, it also increases demand, but the first eﬀect
dominates. Thus, as long as Assumption 2 holds for  = 2 , equilibrium profits and
wages under autarky and globalization are given by (3) and (4), where  =  and
 = 2 , respectively.
8The demand function results from horizontal addition of the two identical autarky demand func-
tions.
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Simple rearrangements show that the eﬀect of integration on the wages of manager 
defined as δ :=  − , is
δ = − 1
( − ) (( + ) (1 + 3 + 22)− 2− 42− 6)
22 + 3 + 1 . (5)
This expression can be used to derive various results pertinent to the eﬀects of global-
ization. We obtain for example:
Proposition 2 For each parameter constellation, there exists a critical cost level ∗ ∈
[1  ] so that integration increases wages for manager  if and only if his marginal
cost is less than ∗, i.e.,   ∗. Wages in (∗ ) fall.
Proof: See Appendix.
The statement in Proposition 2 includes the possibilities that integration increases the
wages of all managers or of none of the managers. It implies that, if the wage of one
manager increases as a result of integration, then the same is true for every better
manager. As the wage of manager  is zero before and after integration, an immediate
implication is that the wage dispersion, that is, the diﬀerence in the wage between
manager 1 and manager  , increases whenever the wage of manager 1 increases with
integration (∗  1). The wages of managers in the interval (∗ ) decrease.
In addition, several simple observations can be derived.
Corollary 1 When the cost diﬀerences between the managers are small enough, the
eﬀect of market duplication on wages is positive for all managers with    .
To see this, note that the numerator of (5) approaches ( − ) (2− 2)  0 as ,
 and  become suﬃciently similar. This implies the result. Diﬀerentiation of (A.2)
in the appendix with respect to , ,  and  immediately yields the next result:
Corollary 2 ∗ is increasing in market size  and the average cost level  and decreas-
ing in the number of firms in each country, , and the cost level  of the least eﬃcient
manager.
Corollary 2 implies that, for a given cost distribution of managers (and their corre-
sponding firms), a greater fraction of them will benefit as the initial market size 
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increases. The remaining three statements have to do with changes in the cost distri-
bution. For instance, a suﬃcient increase in the average cost  for unchanged cost 
of the least eﬃcient manager tends to make managers and their corresponding firms
more similar. Consistent with Corollary 1, this increasing similarity means that more
managers will benefit from wage increases. The eﬀect of an increase in the cost level of
the least eﬃcient manager,  , for given average cost  has the converse interpretation.
Finally, an increase in the number of firms  for given levels of average and maximal
costs can be interpreted as an increase in competition under autarky. Thus, if the
market is initially more competitive, it will require a lower marginal cost for a manager
to benefit from market duplication.
To understand the economic logic behind Proposition 2, it is useful to note that
 =
Z 


 ( ) , (6)
so that understanding the eﬀects of globalization on wages boils down to understanding
the eﬀect on
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
. Equation (6) reflects the eﬀect of a cost reduction of firm  from
 to  with fixed average industry costs. Expressed diﬀerently, the wage reflects
the joint eﬀect of a reduction in the firm’s own marginal costs and an increase in one
competitor’s costs by the same amount. For Cournot competition, we obtain:
Proposition 3
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
, the eﬀect of market duplication on
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
, is decreasing
in . Thus, if market duplication raises
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
for a particular firm, it does so for any
firm with lower marginal costs. Also,
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
is positive for firms that have lower
than average marginal costs.
Proof: See Appendix.
The fact that the eﬀect of integration on
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
is decreasing in  (and thus increasing
in ability) lies behind the wage eﬀects of integration. Together with Proposition 3,
equation (6) implies that wage dispersion, that is, the diﬀerence between the wage of
manager 1 and manager  , is higher after globalization than before globalization. This
immediately implies the statement of Proposition 2 that if the wage eﬀect of integration
is positive for any manager, it is positive for any more able manager. The logic of this
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argument does not necessarily require Cournot competition; it merely requires that¯¯¯


¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
is decreasing in .
To understand the eﬀect of globalization on
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
, let  ( ) stand for equilibrium
outputs and  ( ) for equilibrium margins. From  ( ) =  ( ) · ( ) we
obtain ¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
+
¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
. (7)
Thus, the value of having lower marginal costs (while simultaneously increasing the
costs of a competitor) consists of a positive eﬀect on output evaluated at the margin
and a positive eﬀect on the margin evaluated at the output level. Market duplication
aﬀects three of the four components in (7). It reduces the profit margin  , which
makes it less attractive to increase own equilibrium output by having a more able
manager. Crucially, the equilibrium output  of good managers increases, whereas the
equilibrium output of bad managers may fall. This output redistribution explains why,
if integration has a positive eﬀect on
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
for some firm, then it also has a positive
eﬀect on
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
for more eﬃcient firms. It thus also explains why, if integration has a
positive eﬀect on the wage for some manager, then it also has a positive eﬀect on the
wage for some more able manager. Simple calculations show that globalization also
increases the impact of lower costs on the equilibrium output (
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
). This eﬀect is more
valuable for relatively eﬃcient firms (with high margins) than for less eﬃcient firms
(with low margins).9All told, globalization thus has an ambiguous eﬀect on incentives
for improvement
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
in general, but the eﬀect tends to be positive for eﬃcient firms
and negative for ineﬃcient firms. This observation is the general force behind the
positive eﬀect of integration on wage dispersion.
The following result helps to place our findings in the perspective of existing work on
the eﬀects of competition on cost-reducing investments.
Proposition 4 (i) Market duplication reduces total gross profits if firms are suﬃciently
similar.
(ii) If   +1, ΠΠ+1  ΠΠ+1.
9The eﬀect of a lower marginal cost on the margin
¯¯¯


¯¯¯
turns out to be independent of globalization.
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Proof: See Appendix.
As to (i), changes of market parameters that reduce total profits have sometimes been
used as a reduced-form description of increasing competition (Schmidt 1997). However,
it is straightforward to provide examples where market duplication increases profits
when firms are very asymmetric.10
As to (ii), Boone (2008) has argued that many standard measures of increasing com-
petition are associated with a positive eﬀect on the ratio between profits of good firms
and profits of bad firms. Together, (i) and (ii) confirm that globalization has eﬀects
commonly associated with increasing competition.
4.3 Eﬀects on Total Wages
While the preceding analysis supports a positive eﬀect of integration on dispersion, the
eﬀect on total wages is unclear. We now introduce a specific example to show that it
is not only possible that some managers will lose from globalization, but also that the
total wage sum falls. We assume that ability diﬀerences are constant:
 =  − ( −)∆  = 1      for some ∆  0 (8)
Scenarios Results
 ∆    Π1Π2
Π1
Π2
2P
=1
Π
2P
=1
Π
2P
=1

2P
=1
 
1. 5 10 300 1 100 1.47 1.78 15444 12000 12666 12000 1.66
2. 5 10 600 1 100 1.22 1.38 77112 48694 32666 33818 2.58
3. 5 10 1000 1 100 1.13 1.22 237112 143900 59334 62910 3.79
4. 5 10 1500 1 100 1.08 1.15 562112 337290 92666 99272 5.30
Table 1: Numerical results for  =  − ( −)∆
In this case, as shown by the results displayed in Table 1, the total wage sum under
autarky, 2
X
=1
 , can be smaller or larger than the total wage sum after globalization,
10Let  = 2,  ≥ 2 and  = 1 − . Let 1 = 0 and 2  0 2 ≤ 13. Using (3), total
gross profits decrease after integration if (and only if) 2 ∈ (∗ 13), where ∗ is a critical value of
15
109
√
7− 7109 ≈ 029987.
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2X
=1
 . Total wages increase under integration for high values of ; they decrease for
low values of .11
5 Asymmetric Firms
We now show how our approach can be extended to the case of asymmetric firms. In
Subsection 5.1, we provide a general characterization of the equilibrium along the lines
of Proposition 1, focussing on the autarky case for notational simplicity. In Subsection
5.2, we show for the Cournot case that the comparative statics of managerial wages still
follow the pattern revealed in Section 4: If globalization increases a manager’s wage,
the same is true for every more able manager.
5.1 Assignment of Managers to Firms under Autarky
In this section, we continue to assume that the gross profits of a firm that employs a
better manager increase. However, the size of the profit increase diﬀers across firms.
This is supposed to reflect arbitrary exogenous diﬀerences between firms, resulting from
technology, location, size etc.
We assume that, in each country, managers can be strictly ordered with respect to
abilities. This means that, at any firm, a more able manager achieves lower marginal
costs than a less able one. Writing the costs of firm  if it employs manager  as ,
we thus assume that   +1 for all firm types  ∈ {1  }, and manager types
 ∈ {1 }.
Similarly, in each country firms can be strictly ordered with respect to how much they
benefit from the skills of better managers. Then, the type of a firm and the type of its
manager together fully determine its gross profits. Thus, we write Π () to denote
the gross profits of a firm of type  with a manager of type  under autarky. The
above reasoning is summarized in the following assumption.
Assumption 3: For firms with indices    ∈ {1 2  }, the following conditions
11The table also confirms the results of Proposition 4 and the eﬀect of  on the critical value
(Corollary 2).
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hold for arbitrary 0 ∈ {1 2  } such that 0  :
Π (0)−Π ()  0 (9)
Π (0)−Π ()  Π (0)−Π () (10)
Thus, the gross profit increase resulting from having a better manager is higher for a
firm with lower type.
The remaining assumptions from Section 2 will continue to be maintained.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 3 holds.
(i) In any equilibrium of the matching game, a firm with type  ∈ {1 2  } employs
manager  = .
(ii) In any equilibrium, the wage oﬀers satisfy  = 0 and
Π()−Π(+ 1) ≥  − +1+1 ≥ Π+1()−Π+1(+ 1). (11)
(iii) Suppose  = 0 and (11) holds for  ∈ {1   − 1}. Suppose further that
 =  for  ∈ {1 − 1+ 1} 
 ≤  for  ∈ {+ 2 }  .
Then  describes an equilibrium wage profile.
Proof: See Appendix.
The meaning of the statements in (i) and (ii) is as follows. First, there always is assor-
tative matching, and second, we can find simple upper and lower bounds for the wage
diﬀerences between adjacent managers that are determined by profit diﬀerences. (iii)
shows that, whenever the wages paid to the manager obey these bounds, an equilibrium
resulting in these wages exists.
Proposition 5 immediately implies that, contrary to the symmetric case, the net profits
of diﬀerent firms are usually not identical. Better firms obtain higher profits. Thus
the rents from superior managerial abilities are shared between firms and managers.
Uniqueness of the wage oﬀers ∗ that are paid out in equilibrium is not guaranteed.
However, by using dominance arguments, stronger restrictions than (11) are possible.
To see this, we consider a simple example with  = 2.
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We know from Proposition 5 that, in any equilibrium, there is assortative matching
and that 22 = 0 and Π1 (1)−Π1 (2) ≥ 11−22 ≥ Π2 (1)−Π2 ((2). We will show that
any strategy (21,22) of firm 2 with 22 = 0 and 21  Π2 ((1) − Π2 ((2) is weakly
dominated by (021,022) =
¡Π2 ((1)−Π2 ((2),0¢.
To see this, first suppose that 22 = 0 and 11 ≥ 21. Then manager 2 will be assigned
to firm 2, and its payoﬀs are Π2 ((2). Deviation to (021,022) yields the same payoﬀs.
If 22 = 0 and 11  21, then manager 1 will be assigned to firm 2 which obtains
payoﬀs of Π2 ((1)− 21  Π2 (1) −
¡Π2 ((1)−Π2 ((2)¢ = Π2 ((2). For the payoﬀ from
deviation to (021,022), there are two subcases. If Π2 ((1) − Π2 ((2)  11, then firm
2 employs manager 1 and obtains payoﬀs Π2 ((1) −
¡Π2 ((1)−Π2 (2)¢ = Π2 ((2). If
Π2 ((1) − Π2 ((2) ≤ 11, then manager 1 will be assigned to firm 1 and firm 2, which
employs manager 2, also obtains payoﬀs of Π2 ((2). Thus the proposed strategy of
player 2 is weakly dominated. Thus, if player 1 assumes that player 2 does not play
weakly dominated strategies he will choose 11 = 11 − 22 = Π2 ((1)−Π2 ((2).
Our model clearly does not capture all important aspects of managerial compensation.
In particular, we make no attempt to model agency conflicts between owners and man-
agers. However, the framework is rich enough to generate clear empirical implications.
For instance, the properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 5 relate to recent empir-
ical evidence. In particular, Kaplan and Rauch (2010) and Kaplan (2012) suggest that
the compensation of CEOs is related to firm performance. More profitable firms pay
significantly more than less profitable ones. Consistent with this evidence, Proposition
5 predicts that gross and net profits (or the market value of the firm) and the remu-
neration of CEOs are positively associated. Nevertheless, even under the assumptions
of our models that rule out complications such as agency conflicts, profit diﬀerentials
do not determine managerial wages uniquely; they only delineate a range of possible
wages.
5.2 Integration and Wages
We now turn to the analysis of the eﬀects of globalization on wages. For each of the
 firms in one country, there exists a firm of identical type in the other country. The
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same is assumed for managers. Moreover, we have to assume that conditions analogous
to Assumption 3 also apply after integration. Moreover, with slight abuse of notation,
we have to reinterpret  as the wage that a firm of type  oﬀers to a manager of type
. With these modifications, Proposition 5 also applies to the case of the integrated
economy. The statement and proof of the proposition are analogous, so that they hold
with Π replaced by Π .
For the comparative statics, we focus again on the linear Cournot case. Using (3), we
obtain,
Π() =  (; ) = 1
µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶2
 (12)
According to Proposition 5, the equilibrium wage diﬀerence between managers  and
 + 1 is bounded below by ∆+1 ≡ Π+1() − Π+1( + 1) and above by
∆+1 ≡ Π()−Π(+ 1). We obtain:
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumption 3 holds. If globalization increases the lower bound
for the equilibrium wage diﬀerential between manager and manager+1 (∆+1 
∆+1), it also increases the wage diﬀerential between manager − 1 and manager
 (∆−1  ∆−1). An analogous statement holds for the upper bound.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 6 is thus the analogue of Proposition 2 for the case of asymmetric firms: If
a manager of some given ability benefits from globalization, then so does any manager
of higher ability.
5.3 Summary
In this section, we have extended our general characterization of the matching equilib-
rium to the case of asymmetric firms. We have shown that assortative matching will
emerge, so that more able managers are hired by firms that benefit more from these
managers’ higher abilities. Moreover, for the linear Cournot model, we have seen that
if globalization increases the wages of some manager, the same will be true for any
more able manager.
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6 Extensions
To illustrate the impact of globalization on managerial remuneration in the most trans-
parent way, we have so far focused on the simple case of market duplication. We now
consider alternative approaches. All of the extensions are based on the symmetric
model of Section 2.
6.1 Biased Integration
To obtain a better understanding of the factors behind the eﬀects of globalization in the
Cournot model, we now allow for biased integration, where demand and the number of
firms increase by diﬀerent factors. Specifically, the number of firms after integration is
 =  ( ∈ N;  ≥ 1), and the demand parameter is  =  ( ∈ R;  ≥ 1). We assume
that there are more managers than firms before and after integration and that the costs
of the marginal manager and the average cost remain at  and , respectively, so that
Proposition 1 and the resulting wage formula (4) can be applied. Then the wage eﬀect
of biased integration is positive for a firm  with costs    if and only if
 (2+ 2 − ( + ) ( + 1))
 + 1 −
(2+ 2 − ( + ) ( + 1))
 + 1  0 (13)
This has immediate implications for the polar cases where integration aﬀects only
demand or only the number of firms, which we state without proof in the following
result.
Proposition 7 (i) If integration corresponds to a pure demand increase (  1  = 1),
all wages will increase as a result of integration. (ii) If integration corresponds to a
pure increase in the number of firms ( = 1   1), all wages will fall as a result of
integration.
(i) A ceteris paribus reduction in the demand parameter  (multiplication of  = 
with   1) corresponds to an increase in demand resulting from integration that is
met exclusively by the firms from one country (for instance, because their managers
are so much more competent than the ones in the other country that the firms in the
other country immediately disappear after integration). As the increased demand on
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Figure 1: Wage Increase with Biased Integration
the product market translates into an increased demand for managers, this kind of
integration has unambiguously positive eﬀects on managerial wages. Moreover, while
wage inequality increases in absolute terms, the relative wages remain the same. (ii)
At the other extreme, one can isolate the eﬀect of increasing the number of firms  in
the market without changes in the demand parameters. Intuitively, this corresponds to
unilateral trade liberalization, where firms in one country are exposed to the exports
from the other country but obtain no market access themselves. (13) immediately
implies that, in this case, the wage eﬀect is negative for all managers. Increasing
competition from other firms reduces not only the overall profits of a firm, but also the
incremental eﬀect on profits of a better manager.12
Going beyond the polar cases of Proposition 7, Figure 1 uses (13) to illustrate arbi-
trarily biased integration in a specific parameterized example. The figure refers to
the parameterizations given in Table 1. Thus, we fix  = 5,  = 1, 5 = 100 and
∆ = +1 −  = 10, and we consider demand parameters  = 300, 600, 1000, and
1500. We delineate those combinations of  and  for which an average manager (mar-
ginal cost 80) experiences a wage increase for the respective parameter values. Points
12The absolute value of the derivative of (13) with respect to  increases.
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on the dashed line correspond to unbiased integration; (2 2) is the special case of mar-
ket duplication. For the specific parameterization, duplication increases average wages
for  = 300 600 and 1000. The lightly shaded area in the upper left-hand corner of the
figure corresponds to those types of integration (,) that increase wages for average
managers even when the demand parameter is comparatively small ( = 300). As 
increases, wages increase even for larger values of  (stronger growth of the number
of firms) and lower values of  (less demand growth). In line with Proposition 7, a
pure increase of demand (  1 and  = 1) always leads to higher wages, whereas a
pure increase of the number of firms (  1 and  = 1) always leads to a reduction in
wages.13
To sum up, a bias towards the demand eﬀect ( large,  small) fosters a positive eﬀect
of integration on wages. Moreover, increases in  also work toward a positive eﬀect of
integration.14
6.2 Pure Labor Market Integration
Next, consider the eﬀect of pure labor market integration, which corresponds to an
integration of managerial pools without a change in the remaining parameters of the
model. Thus, in each country, firms can now make wage oﬀers to all managers in the
two countries. Using the logic of Proposition 1, it is straightforward to see that before
and after labor market integration the wages are determined by the profit diﬀerential
that a manager generates relative to the marginal manager .15 As product markets
are unaﬀected by pure labor market integration, there are no wage eﬀects from pure
labor market integration.16
13Similar results hold for non-average managers.
14Recall the similar statement from Corollary 2 for the unbiased case.
15This is also true for heterogeneous firms (with the logic of Proposition 5).
16Note, however, that this argument relies to some extent on the symmetric manager pools in the
two countries.
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6.3 Exit
We consider an arbitrary situation where only 2  2 firms can survive after in-
tegration. In principle, Proposition 1 still applies in such a situation. However,
only the managers of types  = 1   are employed at positive wages. They earn
Π () − Π () = Π (). The remaining managers are “employed” by the non-
producing firms, at wages 0; all firms earn zero net profits.
Therefore, the wage eﬀect of globalization is Π ()−
¡Π ()−Π ()¢ for managers
of types  = 1  and − ¡Π ()−Π ()¢  0 for managers of types  =  +
1   . Thus, to obtain a statement analogous to Proposition 2, it suﬃces to show
that if a manager from  = 1   benefits from globalization, so will every better
manager.
For the Cournot model, let  =P=1  and  =P=1  be the average cost of active
firms before and after integration, respectively. Using (3), we thus obtain:
Π () = 1
µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶2
;
Π () = 1
µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶2
;
Π () = 2
µ+
 + 1 − 
¶2
.
Setting  = ++1 and  = ++1 , the wage eﬀect is thus
Π ()−
¡Π ()−Π ()¢ = (14)
2
 (− )
2 −
µ
1
 ( − )
2 − 1 ( − )
2
¶
=
1

¡2 + (2 − 4)  + 22 − 2 + 2¢  (15)
This expression has at most two zeroes as a function of . Further, it is positive for
 =  and negative for  =  ∈ (  ). Hence, for  in the region between 1 and
, 1 (2 + (2 − 4)  + 22 − 2 + 2) has at most one zero and it is declining
in . Hence, our main argument that globalization increases the heterogeneity of
managerial salaries is robust to the possibility of exit under globalization.
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6.4 Price Competition
We now show that the comparative statics of managerial wages are robust to the
introduction of price competition with diﬀerentiated goods. We apply the adaption
of the model of Singh-Vives (1984) to   2 asymmetric firms by Ledvina and Sercar
(2011). Thus we assume that these firms produce symmetrically diﬀerentiated goods
with constant marginal costs (1  ). We first present the model in general and
then apply it to integration and autarky, respectively. We assume that there is a
representative consumer whose demand for each of the  varieties is derived from a
utility function
() = 
X
=1
 − 1
2
Ã

X
=1
2 + 
X
=1
X
=1 6=

!
. (16)
The inverse demand of a consumer who maximizes ()−P=1  can be derived as
 () =  = −  − 
X
=1 6=
.
Define
 =  + ( − 1) 
 =  + ( − 2) 
( + ( − 1) ) ( − )
 = 
( + ( − 1) ) ( − )
The demand functions for  = 1   are then
 () =  −  + 
X
=1 6=

According to Proposition 2.6 in Ledvina and Sircar (2011), the equilibrium price for
firm  when all firms are viable is
∗ = 12 + 
µ
 +   + 
2 − ( − 1)  + 
¶
 (17)
Setting  = 2 ,  = 2 ,  = 2 and  = 2 in (17) gives the equilibrium prices in
the integrated markets.
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Under autarky, the preferences of the two representative players are also given by
(16) with  = 2 . However, the  varieties produced by firms in the other country are
prohibitively costly. Using Proposition 1 in Ledvina and Sercar (2011), the equilibrium
in each country then corresponds to the previously calculated one in an economy with
only  firms, so that the expression 2 in each of the coeﬃcients in  ,  ,  has to
be replaced by  .17 Moreover, the coeﬃcients have to be adjusted so that demand in
each country is half as large as under globalization: In each of the two countries, there
is one representative consumer with the same preferences, but half the income of the
representative consumer under globalization. Thus
 = 05+ ( − 1) 
 = 05 + 05 ( − 2) 
( + ( − 1) ) ( − )
 = 05
( + ( − 1) ) ( − ) .
We now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 8 In the model of price competition described above, − is decreas-
ing in  for all  ≥ 2,  ≥ 0,   0 such that  ∈ (0 ).
The proof is provided in the appendix.
The result confirms the insights from the Cournot model. It immediately shows that,
if globalization increases the wages of any manager, it also increases the wages of any
better manager. The intuition is the same as for quantity competition: As competition
increases, output is redistributed towards the more eﬃcient firms.
7 Discussion and Related Literature
In this section, we first place our paper within the literature on managerial wages
(Section 7.1). We then explore the similarity between our analysis and recent work
on competition and investment and productivity (Section 7.2). Finally, we discuss the
paper in the light of previous work on matching and assignment (Section 7.3).
17Ledvina and Sircar refer to these equilibria where some firms have such high costs that they
become irrelevant as Type-II equilibria.
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7.1 Managerial Wages
Previous work has dealt with the determinants of managerial wages.18 For instance,
Gabaix and Landier (2008) provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of man-
agerial wages, using a simple matching model to predict a positive eﬀect of firm size on
wages and wage dispersion.19 However, they treat “size” in a black box fashion: There
are managers of diﬀerent “talents”  () and firms of diﬀerent “sizes” (), where
 () and () are decreasing functions. Profits are assumed to be () (),
where    0. For “large” firms (small ), the partial derivative of the profit func-
tion with respect to managerial quality is higher, resulting in a higher wage. While
this model provides a useful framework for empirical analysis, the concept of firm size
remains vague, and the relation between globalization and firm size (and wages) is not
treated.20
Our approach is also complementary to Baranchuk, MacDonald and Yang (2011), who
study an agency model with free entry of firms where managers diﬀer in their ability.
They show that an increase in industry demand increases both the overall level and
skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of managers’ compensation. However, while
globalization typically entails an increase in per-firm demand, it is not equivalent to a
simple demand shock.21
Contrary to Gabaix and Landier (2008), Subramanian (2013) directly addresses the im-
pact of competition on wages, but he does not deal with wage dispersion, as managers
are homogeneous.22 Interestingly, he shows that, whereas reductions in entry costs
decrease compensation, increases in product substitutability have the opposite eﬀect.
Thus, diﬀerent types of parameter changes which are usually associated with increasing
competition have diﬀerent wage eﬀects, which demonstrates the need for a case-by case
18See Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for a recent survey.
19Edmans et al. (2012) also use a matching model where they investigate the role of firm size. They
consider the eﬀects on wage level and structure (fixed base salary and shares).
20Related to the size explanation, Gayle and Miller (2009) have argued that increasing complexity
of managing large firms is reflected in wage increases.
21In addition, it has other, potentially countervailing eﬀects on managerial compensation (see Sec-
tion 4.2). For instance, it simultaneously reduces margins, which in itself turns out to work against
increasing wage spreads. It is therefore not obvious that globalization will have similar eﬀects as a
demand increase.
22Contrary to us, he uses a general equilibrium model and managers choose eﬀort levels.
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analysis. Hermalin (2005) interprets wage increases as a response to stricter corporate
governance rules. Frydman (2007) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) argue that gen-
eral human capital has become increasingly important, thereby increasing the outside
options of managers.23
More broadly, our paper is related to the literature on superstars initiated by Rosen
(1981), who shows how quality diﬀerences between agents lead to more than propor-
tional diﬀerences in wages, turning agents with a fairly small quality advantage into
“superstars” earning substantially more than the others. Our arguments show that
globalization moves the market for managers closer to such a market for superstars.24
7.2 Competition, Investment and Productivity
Contrary to the existing literature, our paper analyzes how the simultaneous increase
of demand, number of firms and managers brought about by integration increases
wage dispersion. Thereby, it provides a hitherto unobserved link between the analysis
of managerial wages and the well-established literature on the relation between com-
petition and firm productivity. Our main result is based on the fact that, for more
able managers, integration is more likely to increase the sensitivity of gross profits to
marginal costs. This in turn reflects a redistribution of output from relatively bad to
relatively good firms as competition increases. This eﬀect leads to increases of wages of
high-ability managers relative to those of low-ability managers. The mechanisms un-
derlying the eﬀects of competition and market size on productivity share some common
features with our approach.
1. There is a large body of literature on the relation between various types of com-
petition parameters and cost-reducing investments, mainly for ex-ante symmetric
23Expanding on this explanation, Giannetti (2011) argues that the increasing outside opportunities
incentivize managers to focus on short-term projects which improve their chances on the job market.
Shareholders have to compensate managers suﬃciently to reduce these incentives.
24In the context of globalization, such superstar eﬀects have for instance been discussed by Manasse
and Turrini (2001), who also argue that globalization increases wage heterogeneity. Their analysis
diﬀers from ours in several important respects. First, they consider wage diﬀerences between skilled
and unskilled workers rather than between managers. Second, the channel through which decreasing
trade costs operate is totally diﬀerent: The increasing wage heterogeneity comes from redistribution
of income between exporting and non-exporting firms with diﬀerent skill intensities.
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firms (see, e.g., Vives 2008). Depending on the details of the situation, competi-
tion makes it more or less attractive to get ahead of others.25 A few contributions
also allow for asymmetric firms. Boone (2000) argues that greater competition
increases investments by leaders and decreases those of laggards, similarly to
Schmutzler (2013). As in the present paper, these diﬀerent eﬀects on the two
types of firms are partly driven by a redistribution of output from laggards to
leaders, which has positive eﬀects on the investments of leaders, but negative
eﬀects on those of laggards. However, the literature on competition and invest-
ment has not dealt with simultaneous increases in market demand, the number
of firms, and managerial pools.26
2. Several papers have treated the eﬀects of increasing market size on the produc-
tivity of firms in the market, where productivity at the level of individual firms
is either endogeneous (Raith 2003) or exogenous (Asplund and Nocke 2006 and
Syverson 2004). In these papers, increasing market size also leads to a redis-
tribution of output from laggards to leaders, but the eﬀects of competition are
driven by changes in the number of firms. For example, Raith (2003) considers
the eﬀects on managerial eﬀorts in a model where (ex-ante symmetric) firms com-
pete on the Salop circle. While larger markets increase demand per firm, they
also attract more firms. Nevertheless, the net eﬀect is positive, and innovation
increases. To make the analysis comparable to ours, one should treat the number
of firms as an exogenous parameter and ask, as in our paper, how a simultaneous
proportional increase of market size and the number of firms aﬀects incentives.
While such a change would reduce profits, it would have no eﬀect on cost reduc-
tion incentives.27 With heterogeneous firms (not treated by Raith 2003), market
duplication would increase cost-reduction incentives for firms that have lower
25In a symmetric firm setting, Schmidt (1997) identifies an inverse U-relation between competition
and equilibrium managerial eﬀorts. Apart from the absence of managerial heterogeneity, the setting
is very diﬀerent from ours: Competition is an unspecific parameter change that reduces profits and
increases the threat of liquidation, which is assumed to be costly to managers. Competition therefore
makes it less costly for firm owners to induce managerial eﬀort.
26Moreover, wages in our model reflect the value of cost reductions from attracting a manager that
simultaneously raise rivals’ costs by the same amount (as a competitor loses this manager), whereas
the literature typically considers the eﬀects of individual cost reductions.
27This follows from Proposition 2 in Raith.
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than average costs, whereas it would decrease cost-reduction incentives for firms
that have higher than average costs. This would be complementary to our result
that market integration changes the wage distribution even if the number of firms
is held fixed.
Syverson (2004) analyzes how the density of demand aﬀects productivity disper-
sion within a market. He argues that higher density of demand attracts more
firms into the market, thereby endogenously increasing the degree of substitution
between diﬀerent firms. Thus, less productive firms find it harder to survive, and
the equilibrium distribution consists of better and more homogeneous firms. As
in our model, the result is driven by an output relocation away from the less
productive firms as market conditions become more competitive. In Syverson’s
case, the very unproductive firms are driven out of the market completely.
Using a dynamic monopolistic competition model, Asplund and Nocke (2006) ask
how increases in market size aﬀect the rate of firm turnover in a dynamic setting
with exit and entry, where firms face repeated idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
They show that, in markets with large demand, the rate of turnover is higher,
resulting in a set of firms that tend to be younger and more productive. As in
our model, the ratio between the profits of more productive firms and those of
less productive firms increases when competition becomes more intense. How-
ever, the diﬀerence in the profits for more productive and less productive firms is
generally decreasing in competition, whereas in our case, this is not necessarily
true for firms that are much more productive.
7.3 Matching and Assignment
Our model is essentially an assignment game. When market integration takes place,
the assignment game operates on a larger scale than under autarky. In this section,
we relate our work in detail to the matching/assignment literature and identify our
contribution in this area.
Following the path-breaking contribution to two-sided matching by Gale and Shapley
(1962), Shapley and Shubik (1972) wrote the first paper on assignment games (also
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called two-sided matching with money or “continuous” matching).28 Our treatment of
the basic symmetric model of Section 2 diﬀers from the literature on assignment games
in three ways. First, on the one side there are firms which are identical with regard
to their ability to produce a surplus with a particular manager. This diﬀerence is not
essential on its own, as the most general stability results on assignment games cover
this case.29 Second, we focus on the question of how the surplus and its distribution
in a stable matching (assignment) change when both market sides are doubled. This
question is not discussed in the matching literature (as surveyed by Sönmez and Ünver,
2010, for instance). Third, and most importantly, the surplus produced by a pair
consisting of a firm and manager — the gross profit in our context — depends on which
other managers have been matched to other firms, as the surplus is determined through
competition in the product market after the pairs have been formed. Thus, we have
an assignment game with externalities. In this respect, our work is closely related
to the small body of literature on matching with externalities, notably Sasaki and
Toda (1996), subsequent work by Hafalir (2008), and Mumcu and Saglam (2010). For
the assignment game with externalities, it is important to recognize that a deviating
pair may need to consider the reactions of the other agents, as such reactions may
aﬀect the surplus of the deviating pair because of externalities. Sasaki and Toda
(1996) have shown that stable matchings may not exist, unless the deviating pair is
extremely pessimistic about the matchings that can arise. In other words, a pair will
only destabilize a matching if it is made better oﬀ under all conceivable matchings
when it makes a pair (see also Mumcu and Saglam, 2010). Moreover, Sasaki and Toda
(1996) show that a stable matching may not be Pareto-optimal.
The particular structure of our game allows for sharper results than usual in assignment
games with externalities. First, some of the impossibility results of the literature do
not hold in our setting. In particular, stable matchings in our set-up exist as long
as all previously matched firms and managers are rematched when a pair deviates.
Second, every stable matching is Pareto-optimal. The reason is that product market
28Roth and Sotomayor (1990) provide an early survey, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) develop a unified
framework for discrete and continuous matching models, and Sönmez and Ünver (2010) provide a
recent survey.
29Moreover, we can extend our results to the case of asymmetric firms (Section 5).
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competition imposes a particularly simple type of externality in the assignment game.
Specifically, the surplus (profit) of a pair depends only on the set of other managers that
are matched, but not on which firm is matched with which manager.30 In particular,
when the  firms are matched with the best  managers, the profit of a deviating pair
is independent of how the remaining −1 firms and −1 managers are matched. As a
consequence, our matchings as established in Proposition 1 are stable, since a deviating
pair’s profit is independent of how the remaining pairs are rematched.31 In addition,
all of the stable matchings in our model are Pareto-eﬃcient, since it only matters that
the best  managers are matched, but not with which firm they are matched.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how globalization aﬀects the distribution of manage-
rial wages. Our key insight is that globalization increases the heterogeneity of man-
agerial salaries, but not necessarily the overall wage level. Numerous issues deserve
further scrutiny. For instance, one could consider localized competition à la Salop and
Hotelling. In such cases, profits depend on the entire distribution of managers across
firms, which introduces further subtleties. Moreover, incorporating asymmetric infor-
mation and agency costs, or increasing demand for general rather than firm-specific
managerial skills would promise further insights into the structure of managerial re-
muneration. While such modifications would lead to a richer analysis, it is not evident
whether they would aﬀect the main comparative statics implication that globalization
leads to increasing managerial wage heterogeneity.
30Note that this holds only for symmetric firms.
31It would also be possible to construct a non-existence result in our model by imposing particular
expectations on deviating pairs. If a deviating pair of manager and firm expected that the single firm
is not matched anymore, deviation by a pair becomes extremely attractive, as such deviations reduce
the number of active firms in the market and increase profits for all remaining matches.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Necessary Conditions
We use  to denote the index of the manager hired by firm  in equilibrium. We first
establish a necessary condition for wages in a symmetric equilibrium. Consider the
best-response conditions. Firm  does not want to attract manager  by oﬀering a
higher wage to  than  if
Π()−  ≥ Π()− 
Firm  will not want to oﬀer a higher wage to manager  if
Π()−  ≥ Π()−  
Together, both inequalities imply Π() − Π() =  −  . In particular,
therefore, using the symmetry condition that Π() = Π()
Π()−Π() =  −   (A.1)
Existence
Next we show that the wages proposed actually constitute an equilibrium. We note
that in the proposed equilibrium ∗ = Π() − Π(). Given these wage oﬀers,
managers are indiﬀerent among all firms and apply first to firm 1, which will select the
most competent manager, according to the first and second tie-breaking rules. The
procedure is repeated by the other firms until all managers are employed. Firm  will
employ manager , i.e.  = .
The only reason for a firm to deviate by oﬀering a higher wage would be to employ a
more eﬃcient manager   . However, by the construction of ∗, the required wage
increase would exceed the increase in gross profits.
Now consider downward deviations of firm . Suppose the firm  oﬀers smaller (non-
negative) wages than ∗ to a subset  of managers ( ∈ ). We show that the
manager with the smallest index in {  }\ will be hired by firm . The downward
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deviation has no consequence on the choice of managers for firm 1 to  − 1. Only
managers {  }\ apply at firm . All the other managers apply at firm  + 1. As
 ∈ , {  }\ is not empty. Hence, the second tie-breaking rule implies that firm
 hires the manager with the smallest index in {  }\. As a consequence, profits
remain unchanged and the downward deviation is not profitable.
Finally, a downward deviation where ∗ is reduced is impossible, because ∗ = 0 is
the outside option. So, there are no profitable deviations for firm .
Uniqueness
For uniqueness of symmetric equilibria, it suﬃces to show that there can be no equi-
librium with   0. Suppose that an equilibrium with   0 exists. By (A.1), the
equilibrium wages satisfy
∗ = Π()−Π() +  
Profits in this candidate equilibrium are given by
Π()−  
Now suppose a firm  oﬀers wages  = 0 for all . According to our matching
procedure and the tie-breaking rule that managers accept non-negative wages, firm
 would hire manager  and would obtain profits Π(). Hence, the deviation is
profitable, so that there can be no equilibrium with   0.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (5), there are exactly two cost levels at which integration has no eﬀect on wages,
namely  =  and
c=e≡− −2+  + 3 − 42+ 22 − 6
3 + 22 + 1 , (A.2)
provided e ∈ [1 ). Next, note that (5) is positive for    if and only if
( + ) ¡1 + 3 + 22¢− 2− 42− 6  0. (A.3)
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As


¡
( + ) ¡1 + 3 + 22¢− 2− 42− 6¢ = 22 + 3 + 1  0,
(A.3) holds if and only if   e. The statement of the proposition follows with
∗ = e if e ∈ [1  ] ;
∗ = 1 if e  1;
∗ =  if e   .
9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Applying Assumption 2 for  = 2 and all  ∈ {1 2  2}, gross profits are given by
(3) with  = 2 and  = 
2
. Therefore,¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯
¯ 
Ã
2

µ+ 2
2 + 1 − 
¶2!¯¯¯¯¯ = 4− 4 + 8− 8 + 2 ≥ 0,
where the positive sign also follows from Assumption 2 for  = 2 . Similarly,¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯
¯ 
Ã
1

µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶2!¯¯¯¯¯ = 2 (−  +  − ) ( + 1) ≥ 0
We obtain the eﬀect of integration on the marginal eﬀect as the diﬀerence between the
two expressions above, which yields¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
=
2 (−  − 3 + 22− 22 + 3)
 (22 + 3 + 1) 
Thus


µ¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯
−
¯¯¯¯

¯¯¯¯¶
=
−2
  0.
Moreover
¯¯¯ ¯¯¯− ¯¯¯ ¯¯¯  0 if and only if
  + 2
2+ 3
3 + 22 + 1  (A.4)
Assumption 2 implies that   . Hence, the right-hand side of (A.4) is greater than
, and this condition holds for   .
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9.4 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) When all managers are identical, the diﬀerence between a firm’s gross profit before
and after integration is
1

µ+ 
 + 1 − 
¶2
− 2
µ+ 2
2 + 1 − 
¶2
=
1
 (− )
2 22 − 1
(22 + 3 + 1)2  0.
Thus, total gross profits decrease as well. Continuity implies the result.
(ii) It suﬃces to show the corresponding statement for outputs, that is,
+
+1 − 
+
+1 − +1

+2
2+1 − 
+2
2+1 − +1
.
Simple but tedious rearrangements show that this statement is true whenever  
+1 and   . The former inequality is the condition of the proposition; the latter
inequality is implied by Assumption 2.
9.5 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Suppose there exists a firm  that employs a manager with index   . For
this to be an equilibrium, there must be a firm    that employs a manager  
. This requires that firm  does not want to deviate by attracting manager 
at a wage just under ∗; hence, Π () − ∗ ≥ Π () − ∗. Similarly,
Π ()−∗ ≥ Π (()−∗ . Together, both conditions implyΠ ()−Π () ≥
Π (()−Π ((), contradicting Assumption 3. Thus each firm  employs the manager
with index  = .
(ii) We have already shown in (i) that each firm  must employ the manager with the
index  in equilibrium. In any equilibrium, therefore, Π(()−  ≥ Π(+ 1)−
+1+1 and Π+1(+1)−+1+1 ≥ Π+1()−. Together these conditions
imply (11). To see that  = 0 must hold, note that, in any equilibrium manager 
is assigned to firm  . If   0, any wage reduction which gives manager  at least
his reservation value leaves the assignment unaﬀected, but gives higher net payoﬀs to
firm  .
(iii) First, we show that, for wage oﬀers satisfying the conditions stated in the propo-
sition, assortative matching arises. To see this, note that the wage oﬀer of firm 1 is
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among the highest oﬀers that manager 1 receives. By the first tie-breaking rule man-
ager 1 accepts this oﬀer. Manager 2 is indiﬀerent between the oﬀers of firms 1 and 2,
and accepts the oﬀer of firm 2 in the second round. The process goes on until each
manager  ∈ {1  } is matched with the firm with the identical index.
Second, we show that no firm can profitably deviate by attracting a better manager. By
Assumption 3, it suﬃces to show that firm  cannot benefit from making an acceptable
wage oﬀer to manager  = − 1. An acceptable oﬀer would require ∗−1  ∗−1−1
because of the first tie-breaking rule. Such a wage would lead to profits Π ( − 1) −
∗−1  Π (− 1)−∗−1−1. As Π (−1)−∗−1−1 ≤ Π ()−∗ by (11), attracting
a better manager is not a profitable deviation.
Third, firm  cannot benefit from reducing its wage oﬀer to manager , while leaving all
other wage oﬀers constant. It would end up with manager + 1, obtaining net payoﬀs
of Π (+1)−∗+1. As ∗+1+1 = ∗+1, Π (+1)−∗+1 = Π (+1)−∗+1+1. As
the first inequality in (11) requires Π ()−∗ ≥ Π (+1)−∗+1+1, the deviation is
not profitable.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Let ∆
¡∆¢ be the minimal wage diﬀerence before (after) globalization, given by
the right hand side of (11). Equation (12) implies that, for Π = Π , Π and  =  ,
2 ,
Π()−Π(+ 1) = (A.5)
1

( − +1) (( + +1) (1 + )− 2− 2)
 + 1 .
Therefore, using (A.5),
∆ −∆ = (A.6)
2

(+1 − +1+1) ((+1 + +1+1) (1 + 2)− 2− 4)
2 + 1 −
1

(+1 − +1+1) ((+1 + +1+1) (1 + )− 2− 2)
 + 1 .
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From +1  +1+1, we obtain that ∆  ∆ if and only if
2
(+1 + +1+1) (1 + 2)− 2− 4
2 + 1  (A.7)
(+1 + +1+1) (1 + )− 2− 2
 + 1 .
After simple rearrangements, this is equivalent to
(+1 + +1+1) (1 + ) (1 + 2)− 2 (2+ 4) ( + 1) + (2+ 2) (2 + 1)  0.
Similarly, ∆−1  ∆−1 if and only if
(−1 + ) (1 + ) (1 + 2)− 2 (2+ 4) ( + 1) + (2+ 2) (2 + 1)  0.
The statement for the lower bound now follows because
+1 + +1+1  −1 + 
The proof of the statement for the upper bound is analogous.
9.7 Price Competition: Proof of Proposition 8
The proof of Proposition 8 relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 1: In the model of price competition described in Section 6.4,  −  is
decreasing in  for all  ≥ 2,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 and  ≤  if and only if
 (  ) ≡ 8 ( + ( − 2)  + 05)2 ( + (2 − 1) ) ( + (2 − 2) )−
( + (2 − 2) ) + ( + ( − 1) ) + (2 + (4 − 3) )2  0.
We first prove this lemma. For  = ,  = ,  =  and  = 2 or  = ,  = ,
 =  and  =  , define
 ≡ +  + 
2− ( − 1)  ;
 ≡  (2+ ) + ( ( − 1)− )
µ
+  + 
2− ( − 1) 
¶
+ .
Using (17), the equilibrium margins and outputs can be calculated as
∗ −  =  − (+ ) 2+  
 = 1
2+ 
¡ − ¡2 + ¢ ¢ 
35
Equilibrium gross profits of a firm with manager  are
Π () =  − ((+ ) ( + ))  +  (+ )
2 2
(2+ )2 
By Proposition 1,  = Π ()−Π (). Hence,
 = ( − )
(2+)2
¡
(+ ) ( + )−  (+ )2 ( + )¢ .
Inserting  and  yields
 = ( − ) (+)
(2+)2
⎛
⎝  (2+) + ( ( − 1)−)
³
+ +
2−(−1)
´
+
+
³
+ +
2−(−1)
´
−  (+) (+)
⎞
⎠
Wages after globalization are higher than before if and only if   , which is
equivalent with¡ + ¢
(2 + )2
⎛
⎝ 
 ¡2+¢+ ¡ (2 − 1)− ¢ ³+ 2+2
2−(2−1)
´
+
2+
³
+ 2+2
2−(2−1)
´
 −  ¡+¢ (+)
⎞
⎠ 
¡ + ¢
(2 + )2
⎛
⎝ 

³
2 + 
´
+
¡ ( − 1)−¢ ³ +  +
2−(−1)
´
+
+
³
 +  +
2−(−1)
´
 − 
³
 + 
´
(+)
⎞
⎠ 
This inequality holds if and only if¡
2 + ¢2
( + )
¡ + ¢
(2 + )2 
 ¡ + ¢ ( + )−  ¡ + ¢ ( + )  
where  is a term that is independent of . The left hand side of this inequality is
increasing in  if and only if¡
2 + ¢2
( + )
¡ + ¢2
(2 + )2 
 −  ¡ + ¢  0
or, equivalently,¡
2 + ¢2 ¡ + ¢2  −  ¡ + ¢2 ¡2 + ¢2  0.
After inserting the values for , ,  and , the lemma follows.
We now return to the proof of Proposition 8. We have to show that  ( ; )  0 for
all parameter values under consideration. First,
 (2; ) = 44 + 243 + 4522 + 333 + 124  0.
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Next,

 (2; ) = 
¡
243 + 1002 + 1142 + 433¢  0.
Thus, (SV) holds if  is increasing in  , which is true because
2
2 ( ; ) = 192
24 + 2883 − 4324 + 10422 − 3123 + 2384  0.
This follows because
2
2 (2; ) = 104
22 + 2643 + 1424  0
and
3
3 ( ; ) = 
3 (288 − 432 + 384)  0.
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